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Abstract
This paper seeks to analyze how the program of  deradicalization in Indonesia 
is approached, understood and treated by radical Islamists. This paper argues 
that the deradicalization program in this country has invited controversies, 
criticisms and even backlash from radical Islamists on the grounds that it 
goes against the principles of  human rights because of  state’s intervention into 
religious life of  its citizens. In addition, it is carried out by violent method 
which mostly ends with killing the accused terrorists along with the arrest and 
ambush by security officers. In order to analyze the focus of  the study, this 
paper employs socio-political approach. This paper finds that more thorough 
approach needs to be employed by the state within the framework of  human 
rights. Therefore, the ideology of  radical Islamism and terrorism must be 
dealt with from two sides; at the upstream and the downstream levels. At the 
upstream level, the program of  deradicalization must be carried out within the 
framework of  interdepartmental and ministerial partnership. This program 
should invite as many institutions as possible to be involved and reach as wide 
audience as possible. At the downstream level, the program of  deradicalization 
must abide to human rights principles. The security approach taken by the 
government should not end with killing or dehumanizing terrorists. By doing 
so, the national program of  deradicalization can appeal as wide sympathy 
possible and will not harvest backlash from the Islamists.
[Artikel ini mendiskusikan bagaimana program deradikalisasi di Indonesia 
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dipahami, dimengerti, dan disikapi oleh kalangan Islamis. Tulisan ini 
berasumsi bahwa program deradikalisasi yang dilakukan memincu 
kontroversi, kritik, bahkan memicu juga aksi balasan yang dilancarkan 
kalangan Islamis radikal. Beberapa kalangan menilai program tersebut 
melanggar prinsip hak asasi manusia karena merepresentasikan bentuk 
intervensi negara terhadap kehidupan beragama masyarakatnya. Lebih dari 
itu, beberapa program dilaksanakan dengan melakukan tindak kekerasan 
dan kerap berakhir dengan penangkapan, penganiayaan, bahkan pembunuhan 
tersangka teroris. Dalam menganalisis tema tulisan, pendekatan sosial-
politik digunakan. Artikel ini kemudian menemukan bahwa pendekatan 
yang berangkat dari nilai-nilai hak asasi manusia perlu dipertegas. Karena 
itu, ideologi islamis-radikal and terorisme harus dilihat melalui dua sisi 
secara bersamaa. Pada level atas, program deradikalisasi dilakukan dengan 
kerjasama antar lembaga dan kementerian terkait. Dengan begitu, program 
deradikalisasi diwujudkan dengan mengajak sebanyak-banyaknya lembaga 
untuk terlibat serta memperluas target audien. Pada level bawah, program 
deradikalisasi harus mamatuhi prinsip hak asasi manusia. Pendekatan 
keamanan yang dominan dilakukan tidak harus berakhir dengan membunuh 
atau dengan melanggar hak asasi manusia yang juga melekat pada diri Islamis 
dan teroris. Dengan model seperti ini, program nasional deradikalisasi mampu 
memperoleh dukungan dan simpati masyarakat luas dan dapat meredam aksi 
balasan kalangan Islamis.]
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A. Introduction
Analyzing the reality of  radical Islamism necessitates a more 
thorough approach in order to capture what is at work in both surface 
and deeper structures. This is so because the reality of  radical Islamism 
in Indonesia is far more complex than some observers have perceived. 
Monolithic approach to the reality of  radical Islamism can lead to more 
complex multiplier effects, such as misconception about the reality of  
radical Islamism leading to the adoption of  inappropriate policies by the 
State to deal with the issue. This can further provoke the resistance among 
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the radical Islamists to fight back against the perceived enemies—both 
far and close enemies—through violent acts. The destructive effects 
at the psychological level caused by violent and terroristic acts by the 
radical Islamists can be more devastating than that at the physical level. 
This can in turn destabilize socio-political condition of  the country, the 
vanishing of  the sense of  security, the decrease in international trust to 
the economic investment, and the like. 
It has been admitted that the State or government’s policy in dealing 
with the ideology of  radical Islamism relies heavily on security approach, 
neglecting the most fundamental approach, i.e. deradicalization of  their 
radical ideology through soft approaches. The security approach proves to 
invite further controversies and criticisms, particularly from the Islamists’ 
circle. The ambush followed by shooting by the special taskforce called 
Detasemen Khusus (Densus) 88 on the violent jihadists is considered 
as an inappropriate measure which in turn invites tacit sympathy from 
Islamists in general. The death penalty given to Bali bombing perpetrators 
(Imam Samudra, Imam Mukhlas, and Amrozi) has also appealed sympathy 
from the majority of  Islamists. A lot of  them regard those bombers as 
martyrs (shuhada>’) serving as a source of  inspiration for the younger 
Islamists to launch their retaliation towards anything perceived as enemies, 
both near enemies such as the police and the ruling government, and far 
enemies, such as the US and its allies. 
The tacit sympathy can even be derived from mainstream moderate 
organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah that perceive the backlash 
of  radical Islamists as representation of  resistance against the US global 
hegemony over the Muslim world. This assumption is not without reason. 
Research undertaken by Erich Kolig in Surakarta (Solo) Central Java 
revealed a staggering fact that Muslim hardliners received tacit sympathy 
from moderate Muslims.1 This is further supported by the fact that there 
is no a clear dividing fault-line between Muslim hardliners and moderate 
Muslims.2 However, both parties can exchange their position and join 
together in one camp when necessary, particularly in the issues regarding 
the suffering Muslims all over the world exposed in the media, and 
1 Erich Kolig, “Radical Islam, Islamic Fervour, and Political Sentiments in 
Central Java, Indonesia,” European Journal of  East Asian Studies 4, No. 1 (2005), pp. 55-86.
2 Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism (Singapore: 
ISEAS, 20010), p. 101.
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Islamists who retaliate on the grounds of  helping their fellow Muslims, 
considered as true jihadist. 
With regard to the comprehensive effort at understanding the 
phenomenon of  radical Islamism, what happens at the surface level often 
differs significantly from what is at work at the deeper level. This is so 
because theologically speaking, the radical Islamists do not hesitate to 
employ the politics of  deceit or taqiyah—a religious doctrine which is 
in the beginning only acknowledged among the Shi’te— to hide the true 
religious identity. In this context, a radical Islamist will be ready to do 
anything, including decieving security officers, as long as this strategy will 
benefit him/her. Hiding the true faith is considered by his/her believed 
to protect theological standpoint. Moreover, showing their true identity 
will endanger their underground activities. Such a strategy is believed by 
Nasir Abbas, an ex-Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI) combatant, employed by Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir throughout his trial process.3
To provide the majority of  moderate Muslims with moderate 
theology in order to keep distant from the threat of  radical Islamist 
ideology, in addition to deradicalizing those jihadist Islamists who had 
been involved in underground movements, is among the challenging 
homework to do in dealing with radical and terroristic Islamist ideology 
in Indonesia. Ideally speaking, the deradicalization attempts necessitate 
two big interrelated steps at once; upstream and downstream levels. 
At the upstream level, the deconstruction of  radical ideology must be 
done in tandem with propagating the moderate Muslim ideology. At 
the downstream level, the construction of  moderate theology must 
be disseminated into the whole segments of  society, reaching not only 
elite class and educated people, but also those who are religiously and 
academically “illiterate”. Inclusive of  this category is radical groups and 
individuals as the target of  such dissemination.
This paper seeks to analyze the deradicalization process and the 
backlash of  radical Islamists in Indonesia. The theoretical assumption 
developed throughout this paper is that, despite the fact that the idea 
does matter for the Islamists, the ideologues (person factor) have played 
far more important role compared to that of  ideology. This is so because 
3 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI (Jakarta: 
Grafindo, 2005).
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it is the ideologues that have the capacity to construct the ideology of  
radical Islamism and convince their fellow Islamists to hold such an 
ideology. Assuming that the ideology matters for the Islamists means 
that one acknowledges the importance of  Weberian approach which 
presupposes ideology as an embedded element exists in advance prior 
to such other extrinsic aspects as politics, economy and social. On the 
other hand, assuming that the ideology has less important role to play 
than that of  extrinsic aspects means that one admits the significance 
of  Marxian approach. Instead, this paper seeks to stand in the middle 
by arguing that ideologues have a mediating role between ideology and 
extrinsic aspects in making radical Islamist ideology.
B. Some Features of  the Ideology of  Radical Islamism
One of  the most obvious features of  the ideology of  radical 
Islamism is totalitarian in character.4 As an antithesis of  secular Western 
ideology, the ideology of  radical Islamism puts more emphasis on 
integrative vision of  Islam as a religious doctrine and social practice. 
Islam, according to radical ideologues, covers all aspect of  life, which 
includes hereafter and worldly matters. This doctrine is called Islam as “3 
Ds” (din, dunya, dawlah/religion, world, state) proposed by the majority of  
the ideologues of  radical Islamists.5 It regulates not only vertical-ritualistic 
aspects, but also totalistic worldview guiding all aspects of  life such as 
politics, economy, social, and culture. This culminates to the need and 
obligation imposed upon every adult Muslim to establish an “Islamic 
state”, through which all regulations which are in line with the shari’ah 
can be imposed on every individual.6 
The next feature of  radical Islamism is literal approach used 
to read sacred texts.7 ‘Literal’ in this context means the tendency of  
4 Eric Davis, “Ideology, Social Class, and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt,” 
in Said Amir Arjomand (ed.), From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (London: The 
Macmillan Press, Ltd.,: 1984), p. 146.
5 Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: 
Routledge, 2004), p. 123.
6 William E. Shepard, “Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology,” International 
Journal of  Middle East Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug., 1987), p. 308.
7 Najib Ghadbian, “Political Islam and Violence,” New Political Science, Vol. 22, 
No. 1(2000), pp. 77-88.
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radical groups to assert what is explicitly mentioned in the sacred texts 
such as the Qur’an and Hadith without taking historical context into 
account. Interpretation and rational approach to the texts is considered 
unnecessary as long as the texts have stated explicitly. The degree of  piety 
is, among others, determined by the extent to which an individual Muslim 
has totally and literally embraced whatever instructed by the texts. On 
the other hand, they tend to avoid what is not mentioned in sacred texts. 
They will consider anything existing outside of  the texts as innovation or 
novelty (bid’ah) which is forbidden (haram) in Islam. They further argue 
that such Western-derived concepts as democracy, liberalism, capitalism 
and the like are bid’ah, because religious texts do not explicitly mention 
them and, therefore haram in Islam.8
The third feature of  radical Islamist ideology is symbolic religious 
understanding.9 In such an understanding, what is at stake is the mindset 
obsessed with symbolic games rather than an essence. Symbol represents 
a determinant variant in the mindset of  radical Islamists. This affects the 
way the radical Islamists perceive all aspects of  life; everything must be 
related to symbol. Democracy, for instance, symbolizes the human’s revolt 
against the sovereignty of  God; capitalism symbolizes the arrogance 
of  Western hegemony over the rest of  the world, including Islam, 
in economy; the US and its allies symbolizes the common enemy of  
Muslims; churches and other non-Muslim worshipping houses symbolize 
the threat to the faith of  Islam; the Cross and David star symbolize the 
devil power of  Goliath which captures and undermines the supreme 
Islam and Muslims; and so on and so forth. 
Such a symbolic way of  thinking implies the tendency of  simplistic 
and reductionistic way of  thinking. The radical simplifies the complicated 
reality by relating a particular fact with the other which is in fact not 
related to one another. This is a result of  the lack of  critical thinking 
imposed on the radical Islamists’ formal training in responding whatever 
they see, read and experience in their life. Reductionism is characterized 
by mixing several things which are different in nature together into one 
bracket of  category which are considered identical. They, for instance, 
8 Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia, p. 165.
9 Brian F. Farmer, Understanding Radical Islam: Medieval Ideology in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), p. 123.
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consider Judaism as identical with Israel and vice versa; Christianity is 
considered identical with the West; democracy, capitalism, secularism 
seen as similar or identical with infidelity, and so on and so forth. 
The fourth feature of  radical Islamist ideology, is Manichean 
approach to reality.10 According to the majority of  Islamists, the world 
is divided into two spheres: right and wrong, black and white, pious and 
sinful, reward and punishment, allowable (halal) and forbidden (haram), 
and the like. This Manichean approach is particularly dominant in the 
area of  Islamic law; either something is haram or halal. The reality is much 
more than as simple as that. As a result, they tend ignore the other three 
juridical regulations in Islam as formulated and developed by classical 
Muslim scholars as found in classical books in addition to haram or halal: 
sunnah (commendable), makruh (abominable) and mubah (allowable).11 This 
is because these regulations are reduced merely into two poles: right or 
wrong, black or white, halal or haram.
The fifth characteristic of  radical Islamist ideology is narrow-
mindedness or closedness from external influences or ideas. Once 
radical Islamists hold something as true, they will hold and maintain it, 
until the last drop of  their blood. In the discourse of  political science, 
this ideology is identical with cultural-essentialism in which ideology 
is treated as a closed entity and does not subject to any change.12 The 
closedness of  radical Islamist ideology is similar to the closedness of  
other totalitarian ideologies. What makes it different from the others is 
that radical Islamist ideology is constructed on the ground of  sacred texts, 
while other ideologies are not. It is not surprising that radical Islamist 
ideology carries more authoritative sense than secular ideologies.
The sixth feature of  radical Islamist ideology is purificationist in 
nature.13 They do not want to practice or let the others practice the version 
10 Emmanuel Sivan, “The Enclave Culture,” in Martin E. Marty & Scott Appleby 
(eds.), Fundamentalisms Comprehended (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press.Sivan, 2004), 
p. 21.
11 Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of  Islamic radicalism in post-Suharto 
Indonesia”, South East Asia Research vol. 10, no. 2 (2002); pp. 117-154.
12 Sanford Lakoff, “The Reality of  Muslim Exceptionalism,” Journal of  Democracy, 
Vol. 15, No. 4 (Oct 2004): pp, 133-40. 
13 Said Amir Arjomand (ed.), From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (Albany, N.Y.: 
State University of  New York Press, 1984), p. 229.
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of  religiosity that is considered contaminated by “un-Islamic” elements. 
Islamists will take into account the issues of  theological authenticity 
contained in the doctrine and practice to preserve the purity of  Islam as 
believed to have been practiced by their pious predecessors (al-salaf  al-
shalih). In their understanding, on the basis of  Hadith, the best Muslim 
generation is the three earliest generations after the Prophet Muhammad. 
The concept of  authentic “Self ” in their viewpoint comprises of  the 
core aspect of  their ideology. In this context, becoming authentic “Self ” 
means obeying all God’s commandment and distancing away from His 
prohibition. 
What “authentic” in this context means something that has to 
do with values (hadlarah), and not with to the product of  science and 
technology (madaniyah) which is allowed to adopt from any civilization, 
not exclusive from secular Western civilization.14 Although they have 
their own dress code, for instance, they subscribe the product of  modern 
technology to make their life easier. It must be admitted that radical 
Islamists are technologically literate even though they are not deeply 
learned in religious knowledge. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
they are quite familiar with the product of  modern technology such as 
computer programs, internet, cellular phones and other technological 
gadgets. Nevertheless, they will not drop their subscription to backward 
belief  in Islam.
C. Roots of  Radical Islamist Ideology
 It must be admitted from the outset that there is no single 
monolithic theoretical framework that can explain the roots of  radical 
Islamist ideology. It is simply because there are a number of  factors 
contributing to the birth and development of  radical ideology. Therefore, 
one cannot point finger to one factor that gives birth to the rise of  radical 
Islamist ideology. In this context, this paper argues that the first factor 
that causes the birth and rise of  radical Islamist ideology is something 
to do with external factors outside religion such as economic disparity, 
social dislocation, political misrepresentation and the like.15 In other 
14 “Fikroh Hizbut Tahrir: Hadlarah dan Madaniyah”, http://www.hizbut-tahrir.
or.id (accessed: 3 December 2012).
15 Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst, 2004).
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words, ideology only serves as a mass-mobilizing factor that escalates 
radicalization level of  religious understanding. It is the actor factor, i.e., 
the ideologues who make radical Islamist ideology available to their 
followers. 
 With regard to the role of  ideology in the rise of  radical Islamist 
ideology, the way the Islamists approach and understand religion will 
determine the extent to which the phenomenon of  radicalization of  
Islam develops. This is so because religion tends to be approached and 
understood differently among Muslims. In sociological terminology, 
the reality of  diverse understanding of  religion is frequently called as 
multivocality of  religion which is easily found in major religions, and 
Islam is not an exception in this regard.16 Those whose religious vision 
is literal-formalistic have narrow-minded religious understanding, on the 
other hand progressive and moderate Muslims are open-minded. 
 In terms of  religious doctrine, there are a number of  entry-points 
where Muslims hold diverse religious understanding in line with the 
tendency or their ideological leaning.17 As a result, the rise of  different 
viewpoints on particular religious doctrine is simply unavoidable. Jihad 
is perhaps among several religious doctrines in Islam whose meaning is 
contested by Muslims, particularly moderate Muslims on the one hand 
and puritan or radical Muslims on the other hand. For moderate or 
progressive Muslims, the word jihad is perceived in its generic terms as 
serious and full-hearted struggle to gain God’s blessing. Whatever deed in 
which one employs his/her full-heartedness in God’s causes, in moderate 
Muslims’ eyes, it can be regarded as jihad. 
There are, however, times when the doctrine of  jihad is subject to 
narrow understanding as a holy war against God’s enemies, particularly 
when Muslims are persecuted and driven away from their homeland. For 
moderate Muslims, jihad at the outset does not have anything to do with 
war or violence. In reality, a number of  wars throughout the history of  
Muslims were reduced into generic meaning of  jihad becoming something 
merely related to physical entity such as holy war, and not spiritual struggle 
16 Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia, 30.
17 Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London & New York: Verso, 1993), 
p. 1. See also, John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 1998).
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to gain God’s blessing and consent.18
 On the other spectrum, there are those who tend to have stringent 
way of  religious understanding, i.e. radical Islamists, who often perceive 
jihad in physical holy war. To them, the generic and first meaning of  jihad 
is holy war, despite the fact that linguistically speaking it does not mean 
war—because in Arabic war means harb or ghazw.19 Such an understanding 
is not without reason, particularly when one refers to a particular segment 
of  classical Muslim scholars who argue that the Qur’anic verses of  peace 
had been abrogated by the verses of  war.20 In this case, the meaning of  
jihad cannot be associated with anything related to peaceful effort. This 
is precisely the underpinning belief  widespread among radical Islamists 
in Indonesia with reference to jihad. 
One of  the possible explanations is relevant to their formal training 
in learning Islam. It is that they are not well-versed in comparative 
perspectives of  religious discourses in approaching, reading and grasping 
the meaning of  religion. A comparative perspective can be obtained 
particularly when one is familiar with religious materials from diverse 
sources of  schools of  thoughts. As a consequence, when one has only 
one source of  reading, he/she will settle on a stringent perspective of  
religious belief  on particular issue. Another possible explanation has 
to do with intrinsic nature or in-born psychological character of  each 
individual among radical Islamist group which tends to be black-and-
white in looking at any issue.21 
 As far as the roots of  Islamist ideology has been concerned, 
there is no single explanation as to why and how Islamism has come 
into existence. Observers point to two main factors for the existence of  
18 See, for instance, Leonard Michael Kroll, History of  the Jihad: Islam versus Civilization 
(Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse, 2005).
19 Brian R. Farmer, Understanding Radical Islam: Medieval Ideology in the Twenty-First 
Century (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 46. See also, Bernard Lewis, The Political Language 
of  Islam (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1988), 72-73.
20 For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see, Wardani, “Kontroversi 
Penganuliran Ayat-ayat Damai dengan Ayat Pedang dalam Al-Qur’an: Kajian Analitis-
Kritis”, Ph.D. Thesis, Surabaya: IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 2010.
21 Devin R. Springer, et. al., Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad (Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2009), p. 149.
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the ideology of  Islamism; internal and external factors.22 The internal 
factors refer to the struggle of  Islamists from within as a result of  the 
decline of  Muslim community compared to the advancement of  other 
communities such as western civilization. Furthermore, internal conflicts 
as well as political decay among Muslim elites have driven Islamists to 
come to the fore to revive the spirit of  Islam. These internal factors, 
according to Azra, are behind the rise of  Islamism in the past.23
External factors, on the other hand, refer to the rise of  Islamism 
as a result of  external drive such as colonialism, political hegemony of  
particular nations over Muslim countries and the confiscation of  Muslim 
lands by non-Muslims. One of  the most effective ways to deal with the 
problem of  colonialism is to recall the ideology of  Islamism by waging 
holy war against foreign powers. As Dekmejian rightly puts it, “a recurrent 
pattern of  history is the cause-and-effect relationship between social 
crises and the rise of  religious, revolutionary, or revivalist movements 
which seek to transform the established order to build a new society on 
the basis of  their particular ideological perception”.24 
In the context of  post New Order Indonesia, crisis theories, to a 
large extent, explain the emergence of  Islamism. The 1997 economic crisis 
was deployed by some Islamist ideologues to appeal a wider audience. 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), for instance, came to the Indonesia’s 
political stage in the aftermath of  the crisis with its celebrated catchphrase 
“Selamatkan Indonesia dengan Syari’ah” (Save Indonesia with Shari’ah).25 By 
campaigning their ideology into public, Islamists take the best opportunity 
out of  the economic crisis when the State was in the weakest condition. 
The post New Order is the critical phase for the resurgence of  the 
ideology of  Islamism. This is the phase where the Islamists reached the 
highest level of  confidence in the public. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that Islamist organizations and movements mushroomed rapidly during 
22 Azyumardi Azra, “Contemporary Islamic Militant Movements in Indonesia”, 
Asian Cultural Studies 15 (2006): pp. 1-10.
23 Ibid. 
24 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World 
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. 25.
25 Ismail Yusanto, “Selamatkan Indonesia dengan Syari’at”, Burhanuddin (ed.), 
Syari’at Islam: Pandangan Muslim Liberal (Jakarta: Jaringan Islam Liberal in collaboration 
with The Asia Foundation, 2003), pp. 139-71.
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this phase and enjoyed the highest profile in the consequence of  waning 
authority of  the state.
C. The State Policy of  War against Terrorism
The issue of  war against terrorism has not come to the fore until 
2001, when terrorists’ attack destroyed the World Trade Center in the US. 
This was the turning point in the international policy of  the US and its 
allies in which changes in the direction and configuration of  countries at 
the global political stage took place. The US international policy, under the 
President George W. Bush, adopted the “stick and carrot” policy along 
with the policy of  war against terrorism at the global level. This policy 
allows the US to give rewards to all countries that follow the policy of  
war against terrorism by giving them certain amount of  funds. On the 
contrary, those countries which are not on the same boat with the US 
policy will receive punishment. This policy gives remarkable psychological 
effects to all countries in the world and makes dividing fault-line between 
the US and its allies and its “enemies” with a well-known phrase, “either 
you are with us or against us.” This policy has been disseminated to all 
over the world, and Indonesia is not an exception to the adoption of  
this policy.26
In the context of  the US war against terrorism, it must be underlined 
that deradicalization program in Indonesia cannot be dissociated from 
the state policy of  war against terrorism at the global political stage. 
At the upstream level, the war against terrorism policy is manifested 
through the enactment of  Act No. 15 Year 2003 on the Eradication of  
Terrorism Crimes. This Act, however, cannot give deterrent effect in 
barricading Muslims from subscribing to radical Islamist ideology. This 
Act, however, can be put into effect when violent or terroristic acts have 
been perpetrated. It means that this Act cannot restrict and prevent the 
spreading of  radical Islamist ideology in this country. The existence of  
this Act has nevertheless been resisted by some segments of  Indonesian 
Muslims, particularly from the circle of  radical Islamists. They base their 
argument on human rights by arguing that the Act has risked the freedom 
of  religion and belief  guaranteed by the Constitution (UUD 1945).
26 M. Saleem Kidwai, US Policy towards the Muslim World (Maryland: University 
of  America, 2010), p. 14.
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At the downstream level, the state policy of  war against terrorism 
has executed through security approach. This is done so by, among 
others, the founding of  specific security unit called Special Taskforce 
(Detasemen Khusus) 88 Antiteror acting as the State’s response to the 
first Bali bombing in 2002. The activities of  Densus 88 have not been 
executed until the head of  Police Department of  Metro Jaya (Jakarta) 
Inspector General Firman Gani formalized it on 26 August 2004. This 
taskforce was fostered by the Decree of  the Head of  Police Department 
of  the Republic of  Indonesia No. 30/VI/2003 dated 20 June 2003, to put 
the Act No. 15 year 2003 on the Eradication of  Terrorism Crimes into 
effect. That Act is widely known as “Anti-Terrorism Act.” This special 
taskforce is reported to have been funded by the US through the the 
Ministry of  Exterior Affairs of  the US and under direct training of  the 
instructors of  the CIA, FBI, and the US Secret Service.27
The putting of  this Act No. 15 year 2003 into effect proves to be 
effective in dealing with terrorist activities. Some 700 terrorists have been 
arrested in the past decade with 500 of  them having been taken into jail.28 
Nevertheless, most of  the security operation carried out by the Densus 
88 is in the forms of  ambushing and killing. This means that the killing 
of  most terrorists in Indonesia such as Dr. Azhari, Noordin Mohd. 
Top, Abu Dujana, the Bali Bombing perpetrators and other terrorists 
has been carried out by this taskforce within the framework of  security 
approach. On the one hand, the rolling of  the terrorist groups has to be 
acknowledged as the achievement of  the Densus 88 in dealing with the 
violent acts perpetrated by terrorists. One of  the missions behind the 
founding of  the Densus 88 is to safeguard the security of  every citizen 
in this country.
The practice and adoption of  security approach through the 
Densus 88 invites criticism and controversies, particularly from Islamist 
activists. They particularly argue against the method used by the taskforce 
in detaining and ambushing the perpetrators of  terrorist acts which 
is mostly dominated by violence and killing. Most of  the targets have 
even been shot dead, something that is considered excessive and against 
27 “Propaganda Terorisme di Indonesia”, http://www.eramuslim.com (accessed: 
26 November 2012). 
28 “Deradikalisasi dan rehabilitasi terorisme,” http://www.bbc.co.uk (accessed: 
28 November 2012). 
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human rights. The security approach performed by the Densus 88 only 
victimizes Muslim activists who are committed to implementing the 
“true” Islam and Islamic shari’ah.29 Furthermore, they argue that the 
Densus 88 represents foreign intervention into internal affairs of  the 
country that can undermine and curtail the power of  Islam. 
In response to criticisms and controversies, the government seeks 
another strategy in dealing with the spread of  radical Islamist ideology. In 
order to respond this issue, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme 
(The National Body of  Countermeasure of  Terrorism/BNPT) was 
founded in 2010 based on Presidential Decree No. 46 year 2010. Prior to 
its establishment, terrorism issues were taken care of  by a coordination 
desk called Coordination Desk on the Eradication of  Terrorism 
(Desk Koordinasi Pemberantasan Terorisme).30 The deradicalization 
project has started formally when the head of  BNPT Ansyaad Mbai, 
signed a Memorandum of  Understanding (MoU) with 8 Muslim based 
organizations on 11 August 2011 to be involved in this project.31 BNPT 
was designed by the government at the upstream level to curb, prevent 
and counteract the development of  radical Islamist ideology which 
reached momentum during the post New Order era. 
In addition to deradicalization program, BNPT forms a forum 
called Coordination Forum for preventing the spread of  radical ideology, 
and it has already existed in 10 cities. Other efforts to reduce violence have 
also been done by other non-governmental organizations such as Yayasan 
Prasasti Perdamaian by involving ex-terrorist prisoners to have culinary 
business. Noor Huda Ismail, the leader and founder of  the foundation, 
maintains that the ex-terrorist prisoners must have gone through at least 
12 months of  crisis period after they get out from jail. This foundation 
is intended to help ex-prisoners to cope with this critical phase.32
Nowadays, the government has been preparing a thorough national 
program of  deradicalization. This program, according to Boediono, the 
29 “Munarman: Terorisme, BNPT dan Densus 88 untuk Memerangi Islam”, 
http://manhajkita.blogspot.com (accessed: 3 December 2012).
30 “Detasemen Khusus 88 (Anti Teror)”, http://www.wikipedia.org (accessed: 
25 November 2012).
31 “Proyek Deradikalisasi, Adu Domba Ummat”, Sabili, No. 08/XIX.
32 “Cetak biru deradikalisasi nasional”, http://www.bbc.co.uk (accessed: 28 
November 2012). 
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vice-President of  the country, has been designed since long time ago. 
This program will not only focus on law enforcement, but also involve 
inter-departmental and ministerial partnership. The formulation of  
the program is mainly motivated by the fact that the existing program 
of  deradicalization does not have far-reaching impact on society as a 
whole.33 The program called “National Program of  Counter-Radical 
Terrorism (Program Nasional Kontra Radikal Terorisme) will involve 24 
governmental and non-governmental institutions including the Ministry 
of  Religious Affairs, the Ministry of  Education and Culture, the Ministry 
of  Youth and Sport, the Ministry of  Social Affairs, military institution 
(TNI), police department (Kepolisian RI), Indonesian Council of  Muslim 
Scholars (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI), Indonesian Institute of  Science 
(Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia/LIPI), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 
Muhammadiyah, Lazuardi Birru, and many others.34
According to Boediono, Indonesia needs comprehensive 
programmes in countering the spread of  radical ideology.35 What all 
government institutions have done so far, in his opinion, is not sufficient 
because there is no common and concerted action with agreed targets and 
goals among these institutions. For the sake of  efectivity, he continues 
to argue, the deradicalization program has to reach all aspects of  social 
life. In line with this need, it is not only BNPT that should bear the 
responsibility to curb radicalization and terrorism issues. Deradicalization 
program must be more extensive, involving all ministerial offices and 
related institutions. The national deradicalization program can benefit 
the ministerial programs by incorporating it with a counter-ideology 
that changes the mindset of people to prevent them from subscribing 
radical ideology.
The answer to the question as to how this program will be effective 
depends on the commitment devoted by each individuals and institutions 
involved which needs to be assessed on regular basis. In addition to shared 
commitment, socio-political circumstances will be definitely another 
33 “Deradikalisasi Sebagai Upaya Mencegah Aksi-aksi Terorisme”, a column 
available at http://www.setkab.or.id (accessed: 26 November 2012).
34 “Pemerintah Siapkan Program Deradikalisasi Nasional Atasi Terorisme,” 
http://www.detik.com (accessed: 28 November 2012) .
35 “Cetak biru deradikalisasi nasional”, http://www.bbc.co.uk (accessed: 28 
November 2012).
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significant factor in making whether or not the program is successful. 
It is of  course unfair to give a judgment on the program which has just 
begun. Therefore, we need to give sometime to those who are involved in 
the deradicalization program to put forth every effort of  deradicalization. 
D. The Resistance of  Radical Islamists to the Deradicalization 
Program
The program of  deradicalization carried out by the government 
of  Indonesia is not without resistance from Muslim community in 
general and the radical Islamists in particular. It is within this respect 
that the politics of  retaliation among radical Islamists can be analyzed. 
The retaliation basically takes two forms; peaceful agitation and violent 
acts. What the MUI Surakarta has done by launching a white book is a 
peaceful effort to argue against deradicalization program. The same case 
is in the widespread writings and articles found either online or offline 
concerning the objection and disagreement with deradicalization program 
launched by the government. 
As reported, MUI Surakarta branch has even resisted deradicalization 
program by arguing that the program serves only as shallowing the faith 
(akidah) in Islam that can further weaken syari’ah and undermine the unity 
of  Muslim community (ummah). This statement was asserted publicly by 
Abu Rusydan, an Islamist activist was once arrested by the Densus 88 
with terrorist charge, along with book launching entitled “Kritik Evaluasi 
dan Dekonstruksi Gerakan Dradikalisasi Akidah Muslimin Indonesia” (Critical 
Evaluation and Deconstruction of  the Deradicalization Movement of  
Muslims’ Faith in Indonesia) held by MUI Surakarta (Solo) at the mosque 
Baitul Makmur in that city, 31 July 2011.36 
 The book is designed as a response towards the government’s 
36 See, www.voa-islam.com (accessed: 17 January 2012). In addition to be held 
at the mosque Baitul Makmur Surakarta, the book review entitled “Kritik Evaluasi & 
Dekonstruksi Gerakan Deradikalisasi Aqidah Muslimin di Indonesia” has been held 
in some other places, such as Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta (UMS) on 31 
July 2011 and in the hall of  building Mu’allimin Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta on 23 
October 2011 which was held by Majlis Tabligh Pimpinan Wilayah Muhammadiyah 
Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta. See, http://muhammadiyahdiy.or.id/opini/baca/26/
kritik_evalusi_dan_dekonstruksi_gerakan_deradikalisasi_aqidah_muslim_di_indonesia_ 
(accessed: 18 January 2012).
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policy regarding the war against terrorism and the deradicalization 
program. In this context, MUI branch Solo is the only branch among all 
MUI branches in Indonesia that gave quick response to the government’s 
policy of  deradicalization. In that event, the head of  MUI Prof. Dr. 
Zainal Arifin Adnan regarded that the argument crafted along with the 
deradicalization project is a form of  misappropriation (penyelewengan) of  
the Qur’anic verses and the Prophet’s sayings that can jeopardize the 
fundamental belief  of  Islam.37 The 128-page book sheds a critical light 
on round-table conference (halaqah) held by MUI Central in collaboration 
with the Forum for Communication of  National Media Practitioners 
(Forum Komunikasi Praktisi Media Nasional/FKPMN) in 2010, in which 
the speakers came from the National Body of  War against Terrorism 
(Badan Nasional Penanggulangan terorisme/BNPT). Even though the 
book was advised by the National MUI be withdrawn from publication, 
MUI Surakarta stayed in a firm position to resist from deradicalization 
project by BNPT in conjunction with other Muslim organizations.38 The 
MUI Central’s advice undoubtedly invites polemics between the two with 
regard to deradicalization project promoted by the government. On the 
one hand, MUI Central serves as the partner of  government (through 
BNPT) in dealing with terrorism. This deradicalization project, however, 
has been deflated (digembosi) by MUI branch Surakarta.
Apart from that, five Muslim based organizations held a meeting in 
Cipanas, West Java, on 18 December 2011 to formulate a resistance against 
the deradicalization program by the government. Those organizations are 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir-led Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), the Movement 
of  Islamic Reformation (Gerakan Reformasi Islam/Garis), the Defender 
Front of  Islam (Front Pembela Islam/FPI), the Islamic Community 
Forum (Forum Ummat Islam/FUI), and the Indonesian Council of  
Mujahidin (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia/MMI).39 Six recommendations 
were formulated from this forum, one of  which is resistance against the 
37 See, www.suaklanjut.com (accessed: 17 January 2012).
38 “MUI Pusat Minta Buku “Gerakan Deradikalisasi” ditarik” (http://nahimunkar.
com/9937/mui-pusat-minta-buku-%E2%80%9Cgerakan-deradikalisasi%E2%80%9D-
ditarik/ (accessed: 18 January 2012).
39 See, “5 Ormas Islam Tolak Proyek Deradikalisasi Eks Teroris,” Detiknews, 
(http://www.detiknews.com/read/2011/12/19/100222/1794200/10/5-ormas-islam-
tolak-proyek-deradikalisasi-eks-teroris) (accessed: 18 January 2012).
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deradicalization program by the government and call for the liquidation 
of  Densus 88 Antiteror. They argue that there is a systematic effort to 
shallow the fundamental belief  of  Islam, to divide Muslim community 
and weaken Islamic movements. They also believe deradicalization 
program as another type of  colonialism on Islam.40 
This forum was designed as a response towards all government’s 
policies and measures of  deradicalization program done by BNPT or 
all ex-terrorism charged prisoners. It was said that BNPT had prepared 
a fairly large area in West Java as the potential headquarter for the 
deradicalization program. Among religious elites who attended that 
forum were H. Chep Hermawan from Garis, Munarman and Sobri Lubis 
from FPI, M. Khaththath from FUI, Akhmad Michdan and Son Hadi 
from JAT, and Abu Rois from MMI. According to Son Hadi from JAT, 
the forum was attended by no less than 200 people from five Muslim 
organizations. 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, in response to the security approach taken 
by the government, asserts that what the Densus 88 has been fighting 
is not the terrorists, but the Muslim holy warriors (mujahidin) who are 
dedicated their life to defend Islam and to resolve the agony of  Muslims 
from the repression of  America the Pharaoh, Australia and its allies. He 
further asserts that:
The Densus 88 has a special anti-bombing military taskforce dominated 
by Christian police under the command of  Gories Mere. Its establishment 
and the operationalization is funded by America the Pharaoh and 
Australia. Therefore, the Densus 88 is the tool of  America the Pharaoh 
and Australia whose mission is to fight against and to slaughter the Muslim 
warriors who uphold the implementation of  Islamic shari’ah and protect 
the Muslim warriors of  Indonesia with dirty fabrication (rekayasa kotor) 
who label them as terrorists.41
Ba’asyir further describes the method used by the Densus 88 in 
investigating or interrogating the accused terrorists as extremely cruel 
and brutal. He argues that the Densus 88 will use whatever method to 
force the terrorists to speak up and make testimony under pressure, even 
40 Ibid.
41 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Seruan Tauhid di bawah Ancaman Mati (Sukoharjo: JAT 
Media Center, 2011), p. 19.
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though it is against human rights principles. He said that the three Bali 
Bomber, Imam Muhlas, Amrozi and Imam Samudra—whom he calls as 
mujahid—were forced and tortured in order to sign the BAP (Berita Acara 
Pidana) prepared by the police with the content of  acknowledgement 
that the first Bali Bombing is under Ba’asyir’s instruction. Ba’asyir also 
claimed that the dirty and fierce method used by the Densus 88 includes 
making the terrorists naked, forcing them one of  them to do sodomy 
to the other.42
A far harsher criticism was given by Ismail Yusanto, the spokesman 
of  the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), in response to the program of  
deradicalization which he sees to go along with deislamization process. 
In his opinion, the project costs IDR 400 billion which is inseparable 
from the project of  war against terrorism launched by the US and its 
allies.43 That amount of  money, he further maintains, derived from Rand 
Corporation. BNPT is regarded as a part of  the US’s grand mission of  war 
against terrorism that will undermine and destroy Islam from within. To 
him, the core of  the problem does not have to do with Islamic doctrine 
such as jihad, syari’ah, but justice. That is, inequality in every aspect of  
life between Muslims and the West. As long as global injustice afflicted 
the Muslim world is not properly addressed, deradicalization policy and 
program will not work. The measure to terrorism, Ismail continues to 
argue, necessitates independence in politics. He says that many countries 
succeed in overcoming crime and security issues without the involvement 
of  the US.44
A more subtle-academic resistance comes from Harits Abu Ulya, 
the analyst of  counter-terrorism and leader CIIA-The Community of  
Ideological Islamic Analyst, arguing that are two major defects behind the 
deradicalization project carried out by BNPT.45 The first defect concerns 
what he calls as paradigmatic defect. According to Harits, when the BNPT 
42 Ibid., 20.
43 “Ismail Yusanto: Deradikalisasi mengarah Deislamisasi”, Arrahmah (http://
arrahmah.com/read/2011/12/23/16989-ismail-yusanto-deradikalisasi-mengarah-
deislamisasi.html), diakses 18 Januari 2012.
44 Ibid.
45 Harits Abu Ulya, “Proyek Deradikalisasi BNPT Kenapa Ditolak?”, Eramuslim 
(http://www.eramuslim.com/berita/analisa/proyek-deradikalisasi-bnpt-kenapa-ditolak.
htm), diakses 18 Januari 2012.
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realises that the roots (upstream) of  terrorism is the ideology of  radical 
Islamism held by particular segment of  Muslim society, the BNPT is 
committed to “over-simplification” to the real complex problem. In his 
argument, religion cannot be singled out as the only determining factor 
behind the rise of  terroristic acts, due to factors outside religion have 
also played significant role such as poverty (economic factor), dislocation, 
marginalization and gap (social factor), injustice as well as the hegemony 
of  the US on the stage of  global politics. He further maintains that:
When BNPT posits that the roots (upstream) of  terrorism is the ideology 
of  radicalism (radical Islamist groups), they are oversimplifying the 
issue at work. As if  it is true that the radical ideology is the embryo of  
terrorism in this country. On the other hand, if  we wish to be honest 
and objective, there other actual factors that contribute to, and have a 
positive correlation with, the emergence of  “terrorism.” Those factors are; 
poverty (economy), backwardness (education), marginalization (social), 
the repressive attitude of  democratic regime which tends to neglect 
public affairs, globalization, injustice and the last is the imperialism and 
domination of  the US and its allies.46
The second defect of  the BNPT is the deviation (tahrif) and 
misdirection (tadzlil) due to new interpretation to the sacred texts in Islam. 
Theological construct of  the BNPT on particular concepts based on 
which the radical Islamist ideology comes into existence is also deviation 
of  religious doctrine. The religious doctrines constructed by BNPT 
are, among others: (1) jihad (holy war), istishhad (martyrdom), ightiyalat 
(abrupt killing operation) and intihar (suicide bombing); (2) truth claim; 
(3) commanding good and forbidding wrong (amar ma’ruf  nahi munkar); 
(4) migration (hijrah); (5) devil (taghut); (6) Muslim and infidelity (kufr); 
(7) middle-path community (ummatan wasatan); (8) conspiracy theory; 
(9) tolerance (tasamuh); (10) state (dawlah) and Islamic caliphate (khilafah 
Islamiyah).47 
The meaning of  jihad, by the BNPT for instance, which is 
transformed from “qital” to “ijtihad” is considered as narrowing the real 
meaning of  jihad. Such a reconstruction of  jihad is considered “illicit”, 
i.e. against the law of  syari’ah. It is also the case when BNPT interprets 
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
The Backlash of  Radical Islamists to the Deradicalization Project
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2013 M/1434 H 149
the concept of Dawlah and Khilafah Islamiyah. Harits maintains that the 
deconstruction of  the two concepts has been done through what he calls 
as “monsterization” (monsterisasi) and criminalization (kriminalisasi).48 On 
the contrary, the terminology “Islam rahmatan li al-‘alamin” constructed 
by BNPT is assumed to have been built on fragile theological basis. This 
is what Harits calls as deviation (penyimpangan/tahrif) and misdirection 
(penyesatan/tadzlil).
The explanation above underlines the fact that the deradicalization 
program carried out by the government of  Indonesia has not been 
responded positively to by some Muslim communities. Among the circle 
of  Muslim hardliners, the degree of  resistance has been harsher. There 
are some reasons why the deradicalization program has not touched 
public empathy. The first and foremost reason is that the program is 
perceived by many as “project as usual” from which particular people 
ca take benefit.49 In other words, the program is understood as a part of  
material commodity among certain elites. It is indeed difficult to deny 
the fact that there are many cases where the government’s program has 
been associated with the logics of  “project as usual,” contested by those 
who harbour interests. The multiplier effect is that the involvement of  
particular segments into projects have left controversies and debates in 
the public sphere. The point is that there is disillusionment among those 
who are left out in these projects.
The second is the government inconsistencies in executing the 
policies oriented to prosper the wider community and overcoming all 
problems facing wider society.50 While the government showing alert and 
decisive in responding terrorism issues, but indecisive in dealing with 
the problem of  corruption, stealing public funding. On the other hand, 
wider community feels that their rights are ignored. Problems inflicted 
Indonesia such as poverty, unemployment, the rise of  price, health, and 
the like deserve more attention. This means that there is problem of  
service delivery from the state to society. 
The third reason is the excessive use of  violence by the Densus 88 
48 Ibid.
49 ”Isu Teroris Merupakan Proyek Besar untuk Meraup Dana dari Amerika”, 
http://manhajkita.blogspot.com (accessed: 2 December 2012).
50 ”Ada Apa dibalik Kampanye Ansyaad Mbai tentang Ideologi Radikal?”, http://
manhajkita.blogspot.com (accessed: 2 December 2012).
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in ambushing the targeted groups or individuals identified as terrorist.51 
In many cases, instead of  sparing the hunted terrorists, therefore can be 
utilized as a source of  information for the purpose of  investigation, the 
members of  Densus 88 do not hesitate to shot to death the terrorists. 
This has been criticized by many, especially by the radical Islamists, 
as a form of  human rights violation, because such a way can be done 
within the capacity of  Densus 88 to arrest them alive. By shooting them 
dead, the police cannot trace further information about the terrorists’ 
link and their underground activities. This strategy, according to some 
analysts, will not benefit the whole policies of  deradicalization project. 
Furthermore, this strategy can lead to counter-productive because it can 
produce further multiplier effects among radical Islamists such as hatred 
towards the government and police officers. 
E. The Use of  Violence 
The second form of  retaliation is by means of  violence. This is 
particularly committed by some frustrated Islamist youngsters who cannot 
find any elegant and peaceful solution to resist from deradicalization 
project or policy of  war against terrorism. The violence itself  reflects 
the anger and hatred against what they perceived as “far” and “near” 
enemies. There have been series of  violent acts perpetrated by terrorists 
as retaliation. The “far” enemies refer to nations or countries—definitely 
non-Muslim majority ones—that are identified by Islamists to be on 
the same boat with the US and its allies in the global policy of  war 
against terrorism. This ‘far’ enemies refer to countries that invade and 
oppress Muslims such as Israel that expulses the Palestinians out of  their 
homelands. These include also the nations or countries that allowed the 
insult on venerated figures in Islam, such as the Prophet Muhammad, 
happened. Denmark and French are of  the countries. Meanwhile, the 
“near” enemies are the figures, individuals or institutions that are in 
support of  the foreign powers in undermining Islam or Muslims. The 
police department, the government, and or anti-terrorism institutions that 
support the international policy of  war against terrorism are identified 
51 ”Densus 88 AT Anti Terror dan Pelindung Koruptor”, http://densus88at.
blogspot.com (accessed: 2 December 2012).
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as the “near” enemy.52 
The majority of  violent acts have direct link to one another even 
though some do not. For example, the suicide bombers in the Protestant 
church Gereja Bethel Indonesia Sepenuh (GBIS) Solo, September 25, 
2011, are of  the Islamist link of  Cirebon.53 Likewise, the suicide bomber 
of  the mosque Al-Dzikra at the police headquarter in Cirebon is assumed 
by BNPT to have a direct link with the terrorist group identified in Aceh.54 
This terrorist group was found in 2012 to have conducted military training 
in Aceh and was involved in CIMB Niaga bank robbery and book-
bombing terror. In a Ba’asyir’s plea along with his trial he defended what 
the terrorists commited in Aceh by arguing that they did preparation (i’dad) 
for holy war against God’s enemies. For him, they are not terrorists but 
holy warriors. He further argues that I’dad is obligatory for every Muslim 
just like five daily prayers, almsgiving, doing pilgrimage and the like.55 
In regard with the ‘near’ enemies, it is reported that during March 
2011 a series of  bombing terror was launched by Pepi Fernando through 
sending book-bomb to several elites such as Jaringan Islam Liberal 
(Liberal Islam Network/JIL) activist Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, the Head 
of  National Narcotics Institution Police Department of  Indonesia the 
General Police Gories Mere, and a Jewish-blooded musician Ahmad 
Dhani. The police have arrested 16 people from these cases and brought 
them to trial. They received varied sentence from lifetime sentence 
to 4-year prison. A similar bomb material found exploded in a house 
complex in Wisata Cibubur, not far from the house of  President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono.56 From the trial processes it was found that the 
book-bombing terror was created as a part of  retaliation to what the 
government has done to Islam and what they perceived as mujahid. They 
52 For further information on the use of  “near” and “far” enemies by the radical 
Islamists, see, for instance, Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam (New York: Routledge, 
2007), 253-62. See, also, Devin R. Springer, et. al., Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad, 68.
53 “Densus 88 Antiteror Tangkap DPO Jaringan Teroris Cirebon,” http://www.
voaindonesia.com (accessed: 23 November 2012).
54 “Bom Cirebon Disinyalir Terkait dengan Jaringan Aceh”, http://www.tempo.
co/read/fokus/2011/04/18/1842/Bom-Cirebon-Disinyalir-Terkait-dengan-Jaringan-
Aceh (accesses: 23 November 2012).
55 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Seruan Tauhid, pp. 144-45.
56 “Bom Meledak Dekat Rumah SBY”, http://www.haluankepri.com (accessed 
22 November 2012).
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identified the target of  terror as near enemies and they felt obliged to do 
something as moral responsibility to God by fighting against the enemies.
The latest terror as form of  retaliation is the shooting of  a police 
officer in a police station in Solo (30 August 2012). It is reported that 
a police was shot dead by two unidentified motor cyclists. During that 
month there were at least two violent threats from unidentified terrorists 
by grenade toss over public places in that city. The first one was on 17 
August 2012, precisely on the Independence Day of  the country, and the 
second attack is on the day after (18 August 2012).57 The selection of  the 
day on the Independence Day is not without reason. The Independence 
Day symbolizes an acknowledgement of  national attribute which is, 
according to the Islamists’ ideology, in conflict with the idea of  Islamic 
State (al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah). In Islam, radical Islamists argue, such a kind 
of  attitude can be classified as polytheistic (shirk), one among great sins 
forbidden in Islam. 
One of  the most striking facts about radical Islamism in Indonesia 
is the relationship between West Java and jihadist. According the BNPT’s 
record, 9 out of  12 suicide bombers in Indonesia are from West Java. In 
Ansyaad Mbai’s analysis, the head of  BNPT, it has to do with long history 
of  Islamists’ resistance in this province against the construct of  the state 
which is considered un-Islamic in nature. As history has recorded, West 
Java is a home-base for the resistance of  Kartosoewirjo-led Negara Islam 
Indonesia (the Islamic State of  Indonesia/NII). In addition, the suicide 
bomber in Gereja Sepenuh Solo is from Cirebon, West Java. Likewise, 
the police shooters also came from from West Java.
In regard to the relationship between West Java and Islamist 
activism, a research project conducted by Lazuardi Birru, a non-profit 
NGO in conflict and reconciliation affairs, found that West Java has the 
highest index of  volatility towards socio-religious radicalism, i.e., 46.6 
percent, with Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam with 43.6 percent placed the 
second. Furthermore, the index of  Jihadism in this province is 47.6 
percent, higher than the same index at the national level, which is 46.2. 
That scale is far higher than the safe threshold index which is 33.3.58 This 
57 “Teroris Solo Sempat Latihan Militer di Gunung Merbabu”, http://www.
kompas.com (accessed: 22 November 2012).
58 “Pelaku Bom Manusia Banyak dari Jawa Barat,” http://www.lazuardibirru.
org (accessed: 24 November 2012).
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means that West Java has the most likelihood of  religious conflict and 
violence compared to other provinces in the country. 
According to information given by Ansyaad Mbai, more than 
100 Islamists are involved in the underground Islamist movement, but 
the government can do nothing to carry out necessary and immediate 
measures such as capturing them due to constitutional constraint.59 The 
government can conduct immediate measure to only 15 of  them under 
legal basis. The existing constitution guarantees anyone in this country to 
subscribe to any ideology, including Islamism. As long as it is believed to 
be manifested in a peaceful manner, the subscription to Islamist ideology 
is legal. The government cannot interfere such ideology, unless he/
she puts the Islamist ideology into action, such as bombing or crimes. 
This means that there must be a legal basis to capture radical Islamists. 
Otherwise, the government will receive a harsh criticisms and backlash 
from Islamists. 
Another fact is the relationship between Ngruki and terrorism. Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir’s boarding school Al-Mukmin Ngruki—popularly known 
as Pesantren Ngruki—is notoriously assumed to have a close relationship 
with the ideology of  radical Islamism in Indonesia.60 Pesantren Ngruki 
has special place in the discourse of  radical Islamism in the country since 
the first Bali Bombing in 2001 because some of  the perpetrators are 
the graduates of  this pesantren such Amrozi and Ali Imron. The police 
shooter, Bayu Setiono, is also a droped-out student of  this pesantren. In 
his operation, he was supported by another five friends—three of  whom 
are known as Firman, Farchan, Muchsin—also graduates of  Pesantren 
Ngruki. In ICG’s terms, the relationship between radical Islamists and 
Pesantren Ngruki forms what is called as “Ngruki Network.”61
Despite this network, no immediate measures by the government 
have been used in response to anticipating the possibilities of  terrorist 
retaliation in the future. Unlike Malaysia in which the state can take 
immediate actions to the suspected terrorists under the help of  Internal 
Security Act (ISA), Indonesia is traumatized by the use of  subversive Act 
59 http://www.voaindonesia.com (accessed: 24 November 2012).
60 See, for instance, International Crisis Group (ICG), Al-Qaeda in Southeast 
Asia: The Case of  the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia (Jakarta/Brussels: International 
Crisis Group, December 2002).
61 Ibid.
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during the New Order regime which has invited wide criticisms from the 
public. Thanks to ISA, Malaysia has executed a series of  decisive policies 
in dealing with the radical Islamist ideology by, among others, closing 
down the Islamic boarding school Luqmanul Hakim suspected of  being 
the hot-bet for radical Islamist ideology (Jama’ah Islamiyah/JI).62 An 
opposite condition is the case for Indonesia where the government cannot 
execute decisive policies towards radical Islamist individuals and groups.
The main purpose of  their terrorist acts is to deliver message 
of  resistance against what is perceived as the enemies of  God.63 Their 
terrorist acts do not necessarily victimize the target of  operation. As long 
as the message is delivered and understood by the target, the mission 
is considered successful. Through the message, the Islamists wish to 
confirm their existence in front of  their enemies. They want all of  
their enemies to take their existence into account in order to be treated 
reasonably. This is a part of  their strategy to persuade the concerned 
individuals and institutions not to treat them unjustly. By doing so, they 
have done two things at once; they protect themselves from unjust 
treatment of  the government and protect Islam from the government’s 
arbitrary actions.
E. Conclusion
What can be summarized from the explanation above is the fact 
that close and careful scrutiny must be employed in understanding the 
complex reality of  radical Islamism in Indonesia. As this paper has 
demonstrated, the ideology of  radical Islamism and terrorism comprises 
multifaceted entity that necessitates more thorough approach to cope 
with. Therefore, it must be admitted from the outset that there is no 
single monolithic approach that can answers the complex issue of  radical 
Islamism. As a result, there is no single policy to deradicalize Islamist 
ideology. Once the complex reality of  radical Islamism is misunderstood, 
it can lead to maltreatment of  Islamists, which can be fatal for the 
betterment of  socio-political life of  the country. 
62 “Dahsyatnya ‘Dendam’ Noordin: Menelusuri Jejak Aktivis JI di Malaysia”, 
http://www.hariansumutpos.com (Accessed: 5December 2012).
63 “Bom Buku Hanya Sebuah Pesan Perlawanan”, http://news.detik.com 
(accessed: 3 December 2012).
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Indonesia is not an exception to this complexity. The security 
approach adopted by the government in dealing with the Islamist ideology 
proves to have invited controversies, criticisms, and even resistance from 
Islamists in general. The Islamists mainly object with the violent method 
employed by the Densus 88 in ambushing and shooting the radical 
jihadists to death. In this context, it must be understood that killing 
Islamists or terrorists will not terminate the spread of  radical Islamist 
ideology. Such a method can even exacerbate civilized and peaceful efforts 
to deal with the ideology of  Islamism or terrorism. 
The resistance of  Islamists can take two forms; peaceful and 
violent. In so far as the resistance is concerned, the peaceful method will 
give benefit to socio-political dynamics of  the country. Criticisms can even 
make democracy better and healthier. But this can be maintained as long 
as the State does not adopt inappropriate measures or policies with regard 
to overcoming the ideology of  radical Islamism or terrorism. Violent 
resistance, however, can be counterproductive in the life of  society and 
the reputation of  Indonesia at the international level. This is so because 
such a resistance can result in multiplier effects that drive the politics 
of  retaliation from the radical Islamists and can be even more intense 
and complicated to deal with. Furthermore, it must be underlined that 
the state repression to Islamists can swing the pendulum of  moderate 
Muslims’ sympathy to their side, in which the death execution of  terrorists 
can generate more terrorists. In addition, the adoption of  the security 
approach does not guarantee the termination of  radical Islamist ideology. 
It is within the above context that deradicalization efforts need 
to be proportionately executed. Treating radical Islamism as a complex 
issue necessitates an understanding that it needs more thorough solution 
than what the government has implemented so far. Nevertheless, the 
more thorough approach afforded by the government in deradicalizing 
the Islamist ideology must be appreciated as a stepping stone in finding 
a more workable solution to the problem within both short-term and 
long-term period. The achievement of  this program must be evaluated 
on regular basis.
Put differently, dealing with the ideology of  radical Islamism and 
terrorism must, therefore, cover two poles at once; at the upstream 
and at the downstream levels. At the upstream level, the program 
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of  deradicalization must be carried out within the framework of  
interdepartmental and ministerial partnership. This program must involve 
as many institutions and has to reach as wide audience as possible. At 
the downstream level, the program of  deradicalization must be placed 
within the framework of  human rights principles. This means that security 
approach taken by the government will not have to end the threat with 
killing or dehumanizing effects on Islamists or terrorists. By doing so, 
the deradicalization program can be productive as well as morally and 
politically accountable.
The Backlash of  Radical Islamists to the Deradicalization Project
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2013 M/1434 H 157
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abas, Nasir, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI, 
Jakarta: Grafindo, 2005.
Arjomand, Said Amir (ed.), From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, Albany, 
N.Y.: State University of  New York Press, 1984. 
Ayubi, Nazih, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World, London: 
Routledge, 2004.
Al-Azmeh, Aziz, Islams and Modernities, London & New York: Verso, 1993.
Azra, Azyumardi, “Contemporary Islamic Militant Movements in 
Indonesia”, Asian Cultural Studies 15, 2006, 1-10.
Ba’asyir, Abu Bakar, Seruan Tauhid di bawah Ancaman Mati, Sukoharjo: 
JAT Media Center, 2011.
van Bruinessen, Martin, “Genealogies of  Islamic radicalism in post-
Suharto Indonesia”, South East Asia Research Vol. 10, No. 2, 2002.
Davis, Eric, “Ideology, Social Class, and Islamic Radicalism in Modern 
Egypt,” in Said Amir Arjomand (ed.), From Nationalism to Revolutionary 
Islam, London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1984. 
Dekmejian, R. Hrair, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, 
Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1985.
Esposito, John L., Islam and Politics, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 1998.
Farmer, Brian F., Understanding Radical Islam: Medieval Ideologi in the Twentieth 
Century, New York: Peter Lang, 2007.
Ghadbian, Najib, “Political Islam and Violence,” New Political Science, Vol. 
22, No. 1, 2000, 77-88.
Hilmy, Masdar, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism, 
Singapore: ISEAS, 2010.
International Crisis Group (ICG), Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case 
of  the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia, Jakarta/Brussels: International 
Crisis Group, December 2000.
Kidwai, M. Saleem, US Policy towards the Muslim World, Maryland: University 
of  America, 2010.
Masdar Hilmy
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2013 M/1434 H158
Kolig, Erich, “Radical Islam, Islamic Fervour, and Political Sentiments 
in Central Java, Indonesia,” European Journal of  East Asian Studies 4, 
No. 1, 2005, 55-86.
Kroll, Leonard Michael, History of  the Jihad: Islam versus Civilization, 
Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse, 2005.
Lakoff, Sanford, “The Reality of  Muslim Exceptionalism,” Journal of  
Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 4/Oct, 2004. 
Lewis, Bernard, The Political Language of  Islam, Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press, 1988.
Mandaville, Peter, Global Political Islam, New York: Routledge, 2007. 
Roy, Olivier, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, London: Hurst, 
2004.
Shepard, William E. Shepard, “Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology,” 
International Journal of  Middle East Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, Aug., 1987.
Sivan, Emmanuel, “The Enclave Culture,” in Martin E. Marty & Scott 
Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms Comprehended, Chicago: University 
of  Chicago Press, 2004.
Springer, Devin R. (et. al.), Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad, Washington 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.
Wardani, “Kontroversi Penganuliran Ayat-ayat Damai dengan Ayat 
Pedang dalam Al-Qur’an: Kajian Analitis-Kritis”, Surabaya: Ph.D. 
Thesis, IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 2010.
Yusanto, Ismail, “Selamatkan Indonesia dengan Syari’at”, in Burhanuddin 
(ed.), Syari’at Islam: Pandangan Muslim Liberal, Jakarta: Jaringan Islam 
Liberal in collaboration with The Asia Foundation, 2003.
